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Fire Was in the Reptile’s Mouth:
Towards a Transcultural Ecological Poetics
Stuart Cooke (Griffith University)

Part 1: Explication
This paper will perform a reading of two creation narratives from either side of the
Pacific Ocean, the relationships between which will catalyse the theorisation of a
transcultural approach to ecological poetics. Such an approach recognises not only
Western along with non-Western poetics, but also seeks to extend the study of
poetics—of the making of language—beyond the human. The aim here is to theorise
how the creative formations of other animals, plants, insects and forces can be drawn
into relation with some of the discourses surrounding human art. It will become clear
that there are strong relationships between transcultural ecopoetics and radical, anticolonialist and -capitalist ideologies. Certainly, implicit in a transcultural poetics of
any kind is a staunch, anti-colonialist stance, where Western ideologies of
categorisation and conquest are checked in order to embrace a conceptualisation of
language as multi-vocal expressions of complex location. There is potentially an
infinite variety of such languages; therefore, a transcultural ecological poetics attempts
to embrace the myriad ways in which an ecological system might articulate both itself
and the relations between its various parts.
To be sure, connections between colonialism and environmental destruction
are well established. Postcolonial writers and critics have made valuable contributions
to debates about social, economic and environmental issues in many postcolonial
regions of the world (Huggan and Tiffin 33). At the start of Postcolonial Ecocriticism,
however, Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin (2) pose an intentionally dramatic
question that requires much further consideration: “Is there any way of narrowing the
ecological gap between coloniser and colonised, each of them locked into their
seemingly incommensurable worlds?” For Huggan and Tiffin, the environmentalism of
the coloniser is always vainglorious as it is predicated upon the removal of worlds
cared for and cherished by the colonised. In this paper, I argue that an attentive
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reading of two indigenous peoples’ creation narratives provides not only a way to
usurp and question colonialist narratives of environmental domination, but also to
draw into relation colonised peoples—or, those people still suffering the various
effects of colonisation—without subjugating them to empirical comparison beneath
discourses of Westernisation or globalisation. Another important feature of many
indigenous peoples’ creation narratives is that they often grant explicitly significant
levels of agency and creativity to non-human creatures and forces, which alerts us to
the importance of a poetics that embraces a vast spectrum of human and non-human
cultures.
By way of illustrating these points, the two creation narratives that I address in
this paper are from very different parts of the world, but nevertheless share intriguing
features. One narrative comes from the Amazonian region of southern Venezuela, and
the other from Northern Australia. They have come to us through the work of both an
anthropologist and an experimental ethnographic film-maker and, as such, they might
suggest a way of responding to Huggan and Tiffin’s question: perhaps, I will venture
here, a discussion across cultures, and, in the places where these cultures wish to talk,
is a way to check any colonialist tendencies in contemporary environmental discourse.
The first of these narratives is narrated by Juan Downey in his post-ethnographic
1978 film, The Laughing Alligator, which was made while he and his family were living
amongst the Yanomami Indians of the Northern Amazon. The story, what Downey
calls “The Origin of Fire,” tells of a laughing alligator from whom fire is stolen so that
humans can survive. In the old days, the story goes, people only ate raw things, but
some children became intrigued when they found fragments of burnt leaves and
cooked worms in the alligator’s vicinity. They discovered that the alligator was hiding
fire in its mouth. The children decided to fool around in front of the alligator in order
to make it laugh; they urinated in front of it and performed various other antics, which
resulted in the alligator bursting into laughter. While it was laughing, a bird flew into
the alligator’s open mouth and stole the fire. As it says in the film, “The bird sat in a
tree, and the tree gives us fire.” Since then, the Yanomami have used sticks of wood to
make fire, and, in the film, the story is followed by footage of someone’s hands starting
a fire with sticks (Jonsson).

https://ro.ecu.edu.au/landscapes/vol7/iss1/17

2

Cooke: Fire Was in the Reptile’s Mouth

The second story takes us to the floodplains that lie to the south-west of Darwin
in Northern Australia. This is the country of the White Eagle people, or the MakMak
clan. In a book that she co-authored with five of the senior clan women, Country of the
Heart, Deborah Bird Rose recounts a creation story that comes from a sacred site
called Djulurrk:
One part of the Djulurrk story tells how the Rainbow Snake
(PuleyPuley) stole fire. The Dreamings were doing ceremony at
Djulurrk, and the Rainbow Snake took the fire in his mouth and
went racing away to find the sea so that he could drown the fire.
He went this way and that, twisting across the land trying to
reach the sea, but before he could drown the fire forever, another
Dreaming—the Chickenhawk…—came chasing after him. He
grabbed the firestick from PuleyPuley and flew away with it. [The
Chickenhawk] saved fire for the world; without his actions, there
would be no fire. As he flew with the firestick… he dropped
sparks across the land… he inaugurated the use of fire in the
land. (18)
The relationships between the above two accounts are by no means isolated
examples of some rare archetype. Rather, it is probable that similar versions of a story
involving a large reptile, a mischievous bird, fire and humans could also be found in
other indigenous communities in places as disparate as Taiwan and Southern Chile.
What interests me about all such variations, and about these two versions in
particular, is how they might constitute differentiations of a kind of multi-local,
ecological ethics. The ethics are housed in traditions of language art, however;
Yanomami and MakMak ethics are instances of poetics. While there are clear
similarities between each account, there is not an essential, inflexible spine common
to each: that is to say, it is not as if each story can be reduced to the same narrative
structure. After all, the origin of the fire in the Yanomami story is in the mouth of the
alligator, whereas fire was already present before the Rainbow Snake stole it in the
MakMak story. So each story gives a startlingly similar, but not an identical, account of
the origins of fire in the human world.
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Instead, it is the rhizomatic nature of the relations between specific elements of
each story that produce the synchronicities. The stories are forming what we could
term an “assemblage” of an ethics, in which we cannot find any central code, and in
which various parts assume levels of importance in correspondence to their time and
place. In Deleuzian theory, an assemblage constitutes a process of improvisation. It is
composed of various routines that are at once establishing themselves, and at once
being “deterritorialised” by, or merged with, other routines. There is not a centre to an
assemblage, just as there is not an overriding destination or determinate quantity of
ingredients.1 That is how, for thinkers like Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, creation
is possible: if things can become other things, then it is impossible to predict what
things they will end up becoming. Indeed, inherent in things is the potential for them
to become other things; we could almost say that things already are other things. In
these two narratives, the protagonist of each is constantly changing; there is not a
main character that we follow through the entire story, who guides us to its moral or
ontological heart. Instead, these stories are more like relay races or series of
differentiations than Homeric Odysseys: the various actors are consumed by the
metamorphoses of a trans-corporeal force or narrative impetus. In each case there is
not a particular creature that has risen to dominate or take focus from the others.
Furthermore, the fact of fire, and of its centrality to human civilization, is almost a
coincidence, and hardly an instance of the human’s manifest destiny.
In order to get a clearer sense of the webs that link particular segments from
each narrative, as well as the webs within each narrative itself, I will now turn to
examine in more detail some of the components of the transcultural assemblage that
these stories produce. The first, and perhaps the most obvious, connection between
each account is that in both Northern Australia and the Northern Amazon it is a large,
snake(-like) reptile (where an alligator is like a big snake with legs) that steals or hides
the primordial fire in its mouth. Of course, the instances do not mirror one another:
beyond the snake/alligator distinction, I have already mentioned the fact that the
alligator’s mouth is the origin of the fire in the Yanomami story, while PuleyPuley stole
it. Nevertheless, in each account it is a big reptile who wants to extinguish, or prevent
the distribution of, fire forever. It is a reptile, in other words, who wants to spoil things
for humans. For the Yanomami and the MakMak alike, we might say, a big, cold
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blooded creature is antagonistic to the heat and light at the heart of human
community. But, at the same time, this is not to separate the reptile from the
assemblage of which the human world is also a part: to be antagonistic to human
culture does not mean that the reptile needs to be excluded from it. Instead, in the
process-driven interrelations of the ecological assemblage, the large, grumpy reptile is
an integral part of more-than-human and human poiesis.
The next connection of significance is the fact that in both cases it is a bird that
steals the fire from the big reptile’s mouth. While some human children are part of the
conspiracy in the Yanomami account, it is still up to the bird to perform the most
dangerous act and fly into the mouth of the beast. In the MakMak account, the
Chickenhawk “saved fire for the world;” he is a Dreaming version of Robin Hood. In
each case, the bird does not greedily hold on to the fire but leaves it in places where
humans can get to it. In other words, it is the bird who grants the human heat, light
and, therefore, their civilisation. If the world of the bird bridges the land and the sky,
and its song the path between pre-semantic sounds and language, then it also draws
the line between cold, reptilian darkness and the light within which humans gather.
Interestingly, the bird-as-messiah has a history in the West, too: in the late 1800s,
naturalist Bradford Torrey proposed that the birds’ “habit of saluting the rise and
setting sun might be the first glimmerings of original religion” (Rothenberg 45).
As I mentioned, humans were not given fire in either account; there is no sense
in which fire is their divine right or an innate part of their sociobiology. Human
technology is not an essential part of human being, but rather is a gift from another
creature (who itself cannot claim ownership of the technology, either). If fire is not a
simple extension of the human, if it is not a product of human ingenuity, then it is a
manifestation of broader ecological inclinations or forces. If the birds provided
humans with the inspiration for worship, as Torrey suggests, then their vocalisations,
and the links of vocalisations to earthly events, might also be the inspiration for
language itself. After all, the renowned ornithologist W. H. Thorpe famously noted
that “however great the gulf which divides animal from human language, there is no
single characteristic which can be used as an infallible criterion for distinguishing bird
from human language” (qtd. in Rothenberg 66). Musicologist David Rothenberg
speculates that “in ancient times, we could understand what the birds were saying”
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(67). The salient points here are that humanity’s reliance on fire links it to birds and,
just as human and bird once shared fire, with us the birds also shared language.
Writing of another large reptile in his “Note on Negro Poetry,” Tristan Tzara
said that “[t]he crocodile hatches the future life” (16). In these narratives it is also
important to remember that each bird steals the fire from the mouth of the reptile.
That is, the mouth, or the use of it, is directly implicated in the generation of
existence. By the time it has become part of a story in a tradition, and by the time is
has been passed on enough times for someone like Downey or Rose to record it, the
fire has passed through the mouths of many different creatures. In this sense, the fire
in these stories functions like a free indirect discourse, or a non-subject-oriented
system of expression that manifests in different ways in different bodies and, in doing
so, determines the structures within which things will relate to one another. If
language is as free and “indirected” as fire, then, it is hard to assign anything other
than a rigorously material function to it: as I will elaborate further on, an ecological
conception of language does not place it in an order “above” reality (from where it can
“represent” reality) but, like fire, it is a phenomenon that is fuelled by and entirely
dependent upon reality, and affects just as many productive and destructive changes.
In Peter Minter’s explanation of Aboriginal poetics, language acquires corporeality in
its trajectory towards the socio-biological sphere known as “Country” and, in turn,
“Country composes language” (7). This composition is very closely tied to the mouths
of different creatures, most of which are not human.
The composition of language in Country is the driving force behind this
transcultural comparison. By acknowledging the complex assemblages of more-thanonly-human actors in these two indigenous ontologies, we accept that “language,” in
so far as Country composes it, is more than a semiotic system of representation;
instead, it is the conductive medium through which the relations that produce a world
are established. For Minter, “Country is […] the lawful spaciousness for the emergence
of corporeality” (7), which is to say that Country provides the conditions by which the
apprehension of the world becomes possible. Then, as a “poetic key to reality” (here
Minter uses William Stanner’s phrase) the Dreaming itself is “a perpetually spoken,
sung and reiterated discourse” (5) that initiates the emergence of the systems that
compose Country in the first place. To reiterate, “a perpetually spoken, sung and
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reiterated discourse” positions the Dreaming as a form of poiesis, a self-sustaining,
looping “onto-language” that binds reality together. More than anything else, perhaps,
the creation stories of the MakMak and the Yanomami tell us that linguistic
composition-by-Country is a vital, heated and undoubtedly noisy procedure.
Language, and meaning, is not only produced when humans want to use it; the world
is perpetually recreating itself according to reiterations of all kinds of noisy codes.
Part of the value of grouping such stories together, I feel, is that it responds to
an urgent need to conceptualise a globally transversal imagination, one that
recognises cultural and ecological differences without organising them beneath
delocalised

or

generalised

planes

of

reference.

Rather

than

being

easily

compartmentalised with relation to global systems of power, these narratives
encourage a global environmental ethics predicated on dialogical processes of telling
stories, listening and comparing. Here, “comparing” doesn’t involve distinguishing
“true” from “false” accounts, or any such deductive variants. Instead, comparing relies
on its Latin root of comparāre—to place together. Comparison is the act of bringing
ideas into company with others. A transcultural ecopoetics, therefore, could be the
initiation of a conversation between disparate instances of ecological organisation,
where these instances are actually narratives of myriad materials that find translation,
at some point, into human poetry and story.

Part 2: Implications
The two stories I have just discussed venture beyond the borders of a single place. As
much as they invite comparison with other mythologies distributed across massive
distances, the narratives themselves thread through various regions: for example, the
chickenhawk across country, or the hidden, “other” places that the alligator can retreat
to, or that are beyond the reach of other creatures. Indeed, the Yanomami story
dovetails with a much broader discourse about the Amazon rainforest as a locus of
both local and global environmentalist concern:
Given its prominent role in international environmental
controversies, it is no surprise that writers and artists have
chosen the Amazon rainforest as a setting in which to explore
the connections between local and global ecology, as well as
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between local, national and international politics and economy
[…] the local specificity of the rainforest turns out to be a sort of
optical

illusion

that

dissolves

when

the

forest’s global

connectedness is gradually revealed. (Heise 92)
While both stories illustrate the potential for “global connectedness” in the sense that
Ursula Heise is using it here, I would like to turn to focus on the ways in which the
stories might [re]conceptualise such “connectedness” in terms of connections not only
between different peoples, but also between other-than-human communities. To
begin, I will join others like Minter in arguing for the centrality of indigenous peoples’
thought in a transcultural ecopoetics.
Like many others in the Environmental Humanities, Huggan and Tiffin assert
that much Western writing about the non-human world is beset by a Cartesian
dualism, where animals and other non-human forms are little more than objects for
scientific study, or for symbolic contemplation of human concerns. Inextricably
connected to representations of “the animal” has been what they term a “triple lack”
of “language, consciousness and mind,” which “is best interrogated by the kind of
imaginative writing that questions, through the ways in which it represents animals,
the dominant science paradigms whose contrasting generic approaches deliberately
foreclose knowledge other than their own (Huggan and Tiffin 160). Here I propose
that indigenous literatures are ideal sites for radically unsettling “imaginative writing.”
Indigenous thought provides a map for ecological relation that can exist alongside and
in concert with scientific paradigms. Essentially, this is because for many indigenous
peoples—Australian Aboriginal people, for example—language, culture and art are
part of country, having come from it. In other words, from an Aboriginal perspective,
language is not an imposition upon “the real world,” so the question of which language
(economic, poetic, scientific, etc.) is “best” suited to describing the world is irrelevant.
For the Yanyuwa people of the Northern Territory, for example, John Bradley writes
that it is breath that links “singer, song, being, homeland.” As the ceremonies become
yet more sacred, “there is only the rhythm of the breath,” without any melody or lyrics;
breath accompanies “the pulse of country.” Breath, like the Ancestors of the Dreaming,
is primordial; proper use of it creates the sonic “matrix” of their kujika, the songpoetry
which represents the ecological coherence and unity of the Law (Bradley with
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Yanyuwa families 245). We return to Minter’s key claim, then, that as language is
realised within and in response to Country, it is Country that composes language (7).
Language, therefore, is part of Country’s creative composition. In Aboriginal poetics,
as in many models of indigenous South American poetics (Cooke, “What’s an
Ecologically Sensitive Poetics?”), we find the possibility for ecological relation in the
attention to the breath as a literal and mythological act of modification—both as the
lungs take in and release turbulence into the surrounding air, and as the singing voice
borrows from the primordial breath so that it may elaborate upon the templates that
were created by Dreaming Ancestors (or, becoming more metaphorical, as the bird
steals fire from the mouth of a large reptile so that new creations can occur). After all,
to channel the Dreaming in poetry is to channel ecological poiesis itself (Minter 5-6).
For Philip Mead, indigenous poetries form part of a multi-cultural aesthetic
that enacts “linguistic resistance and adaptation.” Various centralised institutions,
governmental and otherwise, “seek to repress […] the lexical unconscious, the
potentiality of language’s coercion by dominant ideologies to be exposed, to erupt, to
unsettle.” Indigenous poetries, however, have the capacity to contest political ideas of
nation and identity because of the poets’ general unease with such terms and
conditions, and with their distance from colonial traditions of language and literature
(Mead 28). Mead sees in contemporary Aboriginal poets such as Lionel Fogarty
evidence for the ways that “language persists as a site of political contestation and
continually emergent realities in contemporary Australian life.” In this light,
Aboriginal poetry can be “a complex sign of how the apparent settledness of language
in contemporary Australia is maintained at a cost, the cost of interdicting, for
example, the self- and cultural formation of Aboriginal and migrant Australians”
(Mead 421). The radical potential of indigenous poetry and poetics, therefore, is its
capacity to “imagine through, and in, language as an alternative polis, a poetic space
where the diversities of politics and identity are to be articulated.” If such political
“diversities” extend ecologically across the biosphere, then the alternative polis of
indigenous poetics could remedy not only “the linguistic disorders that the Australian
settlement suffers from” (Mead 454), but also its multiple failures of ecological
relation. In these contexts, an indigenous poetics, with its roots in oral and
performative modes, in mythological and contemporary concerns, and in traditions of

Published by Research Online, 2016

9

Landscapes: the Journal of the International Centre for Landscape and Language, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 17

protest and of care for Country, verges towards the “productive poetry” theorised by
Laura Elrick:
A poetry that challenges the relegation of cultural activity to the
page or stage, one that engages and attends to the production of
lived and abstract space, analysing and intervening in the
naturalisation of such processes, contributes to the production of
an ecology for living things. (199)
That indigenous poetics might align so well with some of the concerns of
contemporary poets and theorists is no coincidence, either. Many of the traditions
fundamental to various indigenous oral and written poetries in both Australia and
South America (such as the common reluctance to attribute sole authorship to a work,
or the freedom to manipulate the precise text of a work within certain received
structures, or the capacity for a work to be continuously recomposed or re-situated as
new situations require) align with contemporary situations in experimental poetics.
Described by Kenneth Goldsmith as “Uncreative Writing,” contemporary conceptual
poetics responds to an online environment of proliferating quantities of text, in which
the author need no longer “write” his or her own material, but can instead “make” his
or her text from what is available already on the Internet. The author becomes like an
artist of bricolage, sifting through heaps of data in order to forge new connections
between fragments of syntax. In the case of the bricoleur as of the indigenous
songpoet, “mimesis and replication doesn’t eradicate authorship” (Goldsmith 10) but
rather expands the role of “the author” to something of a transversal framer or collator
of material from many disparate worlds. Such a conceptualisation might also radically
critique a poetics of colonisation, where the One Truth, One Language and One
Culture of the Sole Poet suppresses the cultures of Others. Where the classically
Western poet might, in Heidegger’s sense of the term, “dwell,” or clear or free a place
for settlement and habitation and, more precisely, to conquer and colonise land
(Noland 402), a transcultural poetics of indigenous and more-than-human
participants actively erodes such impositions.
Thus, concomitant with the centrality of indigenous thought in new
theorisations of ecological poetics is the decentrality of human-only conceptions of
“the poetic,” of art, or of creativity in general. Because of the key role of a bird in each
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of the above narratives, in this space I will turn to focus on approaching bird song as
an example of a non-human poetics. However, while bird song has received much
scholarly attention from multiple disciplines, it should by no means be the only
counterpoint to human poetics. “Poetics” in its broadest sense can involve many kinds
of making from many kinds of animals (see, for example, Moe). Nevertheless, bird
song is a compelling instance of cross-species poetical relation, one which is
inaugurated by another creation narrative, this time from the paleontological record.
Here, bird song is the spectral ancestor for all song (and music, and poetry):
Nearly a hundred million years ago songbirds emanated across
the globe from Gondwanaland, with a generalized superbird like
the lyrebird a probable ancestor […] His leaping silhouette at
dawn resembles the famed archaeopteryx who is the link
between dinosaur and bird, the singing ghost of a transitory past
living on into our time. (Rothenberg 227)
Indeed, in terms of certain aspects of brain structure, humans are closer to songbirds
than to the great apes because each shares “the ability to learn to sing, something no
ape can do” (Rothenberg 146). By forming alternative, rhizomatic relations across two
distinct “strata” of evolution, an intriguing familial relationship emerges between birds
and humans.
As poetry is key to the structuring of the Dreaming, so too might it be key to
conceptualising non-human creativity. For Rothenberg, the limits to which poetry
takes language—limits that are reached in order to produce the maximum possible
affective potency—“is best at revealing the immediacy and necessity of bird sounds.”
Musical and scientific paradigms are important as well, of course, but it is in the poem,
as a written piece of melodic epistemology, that we can produce the most tangible
fusion of both. Rothenberg shows that many attempts to reach bird song with
standard musical notation have resulted in the musician being “driven into poetry at
the sheer magnificence of the sound of a bird.” This, he says, is because “[b]ird song
makes its most attentive human listeners surge into poetry” (Rothenberg 54). Yet by
the same token, when we talk of “poetry” in this sense we need to figure language as a
collection of primarily gestural, more-than-semantic materials, for semantics tell us
little about bird song:
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When it comes to birds, ‘there is no equivalent distinction
between language-like [clusters of sound in meaningful
structures] and speech-like [the production of sound itself]
properties. One word, “song,” represents both production of
learned sounds and their sequencing’. Information is not the
most salient quality encoded in bird song. There is form and
purpose in birds’ sounds, but no message to be extracted from
the sound that makes any sense without the sound’s original
shape […] The song many birds sing is more akin to music than
language because… the syllables change gradually from one form
to another. They are not usually as distinct as the sounds of
language [emphasis added]. (Jarvis qtd. in Rothenberg 157–58)
For this reason, Rothenberg writes, “[t]he quality of the poem matters less than the
need to go there: we want to stretch language beyond its ability to explain, into its
chance to evoke [emphasis added]” (54). The drive to poetic expression in the face of
bird song is a drive to the more-than-human power of affect. Writers like Rothenberg
are arguing for what the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea already know, that:
[h]uman songs are bird songs, and the words of a song are called
‘bird sound words’. They […] are comprehensible but unlike
anything in the spoken language, words that have a meaning
underneath, on the other side [emphasis added]. (Weinberger 58)
Nevertheless, an obstacle to transcultural ecopoetics might be a concern about
the thinking subject’s ability to interpret “meaning” in diverse varieties of ecological
expression. Inherent in such a concern, however, is an assumption that expression is
defined by intelligible semantic content, as opposed to the relations it assumes with
contextual particularities. At the level of human language, we know that much of our
expression depends greatly on when and how it is used—both in terms of the position
of a phrase with relation to other phrases, and in terms of the way a phrase is
articulated and its relationship to non-linguistic hand and facial expressions, not to
mention its relationship to the physical arrangement of the space it occurs within. At
the same time, in many kinds of oral and avant-garde poetries, words need not have
any meaning in themselves, but provide other sonic or graphic textures. Similarly, at
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the most fundamental levels of biology, we find that some DNA is “junk DNA,” or “a
free-riding, harmless parasite that doesn’t get ‘expressed’ in a phenotype at all.”
Furthermore, writes Morton, “there is no life-flavoured DNA.” This is to say that at the
basis of “life” there is no associated strand of DNA that necessarily signifies its
production, meaning that:
‘Life’ is a word for some self-replicating macro-molecules and
their transport systems. But for ‘life’ to start, there had to be a
‘pre-living life’: otherwise, there would be an infinite regress or
sudden creation from nothing. The movement that commences
‘life’ is to be found within matter itself. (Morton 66–7)
As “life” (or: the coherent replication of DNA strands and their meaningful
communication), emerges from “non-living” matter, so too does linguistic
communication proceed from evolved combinations of non-semantic (“non-living”)
sounds. “Language—an accumulation of words in a particular system—like all living
creatures, lives and dies by the transformational laws of evolution…” (Magi 275). In
partnership with other sounds and with grammatical and syntactical frameworks,
non-semantic sounds can contribute to intelligible structures. Such intelligible,
“living” structures are not inherently different than those which are apparently
nonsensical. Thus, words need not be attended to purely for their anthropocentric
semantic value, just as the apparent absence of semantic content in non-human
expression need not be reason for its exclusion from an ecopoetics. “We may widen
the realm of art,” writes David Rothenberg, “just as we expand ethics to include the
environment…” (11).
Rather than two separate tasks, of translation between indigenous and nonindigenous poetics, and then of human and non-human poetics, I am arguing here
that in a sense there is only one task, to translate between the humanist tradition of
the West and everything else. Such translation, however, unsettles much of the
prevailing orthodoxies in contemporary literary theory and philosophy. As David
Brooks (57) writes:
Is it any accident that some of the most dominant ideas
concerning literature’s relation to the world are in fact ideas of
disconnection, inaccessibility and non-relation? Whose or what
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purposes does it really serve to believe that we are trapped in a
prison-house of language? Whose or what purposes does it serve
to believe that there is no inherent connection between word
and thing?
Brooks argues that twentieth-century literary theory has led us to conceive of a
linguistic prison-house, in which the human mind is isolated entirely from everything
else. He then proposes “an alternate route,” one motivated by priorities of care and
connection rather than division and exploitation (it is easier to exploit that which we
are not connected to). Following such a route might lead us “to emphasise that sense
in which language itself is stimulated by our need for and relationship with the world,
rather than as something which emblematises the world’s absence” (Brooks 58–9). The
problem for Brooks, as for many ecocritical theorists, is that human cognition and
culture have become transcendent realms, outside of which little has meaning and/or
value.
How to respond to this situation is a central preoccupation of contemporary
ecopoetics. In Evelyn Reilly’s (257) terms, this is:
a search for language that coheres with evolution, with our
destiny as animals among other plants and animals. A search for
a poetry that is firmly attached to earthly being and that is thus
dis-enchanted, in the sense of being free from the mesmerizing
spell of the transcendent. For ecopoetics reflects yet another in a
series of human decenterings, as from an ecological perspective,
the self dissolves into the gene pool and the species into the
ecosystem [...] In fact, ecopoetics requires the abandonment of
the idea of a center for a position in an infinitely extensive net of
relations…
The abandonment of the “idea of the center” takes us into an explicitly transcultural
environment, or, in Marcella Durand’s words “seeks an equality of value between all
living and unliving things, [and] explores multiple perspectives as an attempt to
subvert the dominant paradigms of mono-perception, consumption and hierarchy…”
(118). With its postmodernist inflections, Durand’s language is functional as feminist,
postcolonial and ecological theorisation. But now the subversion of “dominant
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paradigms” extends to the previously transcendent realms of human cognition and
culture as well.
However, this subversion cannot occur only at the level of lived experience, or
only through the phenomenological unit of the human body. As each creation
narrative from Part 1 of this essay travels beyond the limits of any single actor, so too
does the climate crisis demand a more integrated, global imagination of ecological
complexity. As Heise argues in her seminal Sense of Place and Sense of Planet, “one of
the crucial challenges for artists and writers, and beyond them, for all those engaged
with environmentalist thought, is the creation of a vision of the global that integrates
allegory […] into a more complex formal framework able to accommodate social and
cultural multiplicity” (21). The two creation narratives that I have discussed here might
indeed share relationships to the allegorical mode; furthermore, their capacities for
internal, allegorical complexity—where a particular narrative might engender multiple
possible allegorical configurations—and cross-continental relation with other
narratives allows them to form rhizomatic linkages with other regions, thereby
gesturing towards a framework of the complexity that Heise proposes. It is also
important that each narrative belongs to an indigenous group in a territory colonised
by a foreign power, firstly because each group maintains commitments to the
custodianship of a particular territory (i.e., not to a transcendent or global sense of
“The Earth”), and secondly because each narrative is an instance of a theory of
language that differs markedly from the Western tradition and its exploitative
tendencies. By linking these two localities, we might establish a local-global framework
of eco-poethical relation.
Consequently, the challenge posed by globalisation for the environmental
movement is, in Heise’s words “to envision how ecologically based advocacy on behalf
of the nonhuman world as well as on behalf of greater socioenvironmental justice
might be formulated in terms that are premised no longer primarily on ties to local
places but on territories and systems that are understood to encompass the planet as a
whole” (10). Of course, what is equally important is that this planetary
environmentalism does not come at the expense of attention to local ecologies and, in
particular, localised indigenous ecological knowledges and custodial rights. Otherwise,
a “global” sense of the environment risks replicating older and more familiar kinds of
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colonisation. As I have argued elsewhere, it is crucial that regional ecologies are
understood in a global sense without subsuming their particular differences beneath
delocalised languages that are less sensitive to their regional particularities (Cooke,
Speaking 263). In Heise’s terms, this amounts to a challenge to “imagine local
environments less as foundations for an unalienated existence than as habitats that are
ceaselessly being reshaped by the encroachment of the global as well as their own
inherent dynamism.” With such an open-ended notion of “place,” the focus for
environmentalism would not be “to preserve pristine, authentic ecosystems,” but
would instead nurture their capacity “to change and evolve.” Nevertheless, such a
resolution still comes with its own problems: “it raises the difficult question of how an
endorsement of constant transformation and change would allow one to discriminate
between the inherently dynamic evolution of ecosystems and the kinds of disruptive
change that might ultimately lead to serious ecosystemic problems and failures”
(Heise 114).
In this essay, I have suggested that indigenous ecological knowledges—
invariably developed over millennia—are capable of discriminating between
“inherently dynamic evolution” and “disruptive change.” Crucially, just as the MakMak
and Yanomami creation narratives describe worlds of many important human and
non-human participants, their comparison results in ethical principles that cross not
only between cultures, but also between species. Such an interconnected, interspecies
poetics requires that our forms of address—both our notions of who we are as
speakers, and to whom we are speaking—must change radically. Since “we are made of
others,” to quote Morton, our selves must be rethought as multiple, necessarily
altruistic ones. To live in such a state of deeply enmeshed ecological connectedness
means we “must justify action by more than appeals to ourselves or to our immediate
kin” (Morton 119). Since we are operating in systems that are far more complex than
our understandings of them, consequentialist reasoning based on outcomes for certain
individuals will always be hopelessly overwhelmed by myriad other factors. In Aldo
Leopold’s famous words, “[e]cology is the science of communities and the ecological
consciousness is therefore the ethics of community life” (qtd. in Reilly 260).
Ultimately, this means that the initial region of a transcultural poetical investigation
will actually take us towards another one entirely. The aesthetic attention to narratives
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of creation and poetic instantiation translates to ethical commitments to ecosystemic
arrangements of species. In other words, from the aesthetic appeal of a cross-species
poetics comes an ethical responsibility to maintain these poetics: an ecological poetics
is also an ecological ethics.
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Notes
1

See, for example, the useful definition provided by Claire Colebrook: “There is no finality, end or order that would
govern the assemblage as a whole; the law of any assemblage is created from its connections” (xx).
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